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The Costs of Abusing Probationary
Sentences
OVERINCARCERATION AND THE EROSION OF DUE
PROCESS
Andrew Horwitz†
I.

INTRODUCTION

The American criminal justice system has an apparent
addiction to the use of probation as a means for adjudicating
vast numbers of cases, particularly misdemeanors. With little
discussion of or agreement about the appropriateness or
efficacy of this sentencing practice, probation has become by far
the most common form of criminal sentencing. While the
primary justification given for such heavy reliance on probation
is that we simply do not have the resources to incarcerate these
offenders, that justification cannot survive serious scrutiny. In
the first instance, it relies on the premise that we would, if we
could, incarcerate huge numbers of low-level offenders, a
proposition that is highly unrealistic. Additionally, however,
because probation violators constitute the fastest growing
component of an exploding prison population, it may well be
that our reliance on probation as a default sentence is not
really reducing our incarceration ranks, but simply
reorganizing them to incarcerate different offenders.1 So if the
†
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1
There are tremendous but largely unexplored public policy ramifications
when decisions about whom to incarcerate are made in such a backward and
unintentional fashion. For instance, if any interaction with the criminal justice system
can easily escalate to incarceration, the system will disproportionately incarcerate
those who are most likely to have that interaction, most notably the urban poor and
people of color. See, e.g., Jerome Miller, Do We Really Need More Prisons?, N.J.
RECORD, May 14, 1989, at O1 (noting that in certain parts of the country, seven out of
ten young black men can expect to be arrested at least once).
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use of probation as a default sentence for those we do not
incarcerate cannot be justified on those grounds, why have we
continued down this path? And at what cost?
There are two clear and direct consequences of the
overuse and abuse of probation as a criminal disposition. The
first is that we are losing a tremendous opportunity to use
probation for its historically intended purpose: rehabilitation.
When the numbers of probationers becomes so large that
supervision and the provision of services and support becomes
impossible, the reformative potential of probation is completely
lost. The second and more disturbing consequence is the
creation of a shadow criminal justice system in which an
extraordinary percentage of criminal charges is resolved not
through our normal adjudicative process, but rather through a
probation violation process that runs roughshod over the
constitutional rights of the accused. When a probationer is
charged with a new criminal offense, that new offense typically
generates a corresponding allegation that the probationer
violated the terms of his or her probation. When the new
charge is processed as an alleged probation violation, the
probationer is entitled only to a limited hearing at which the
rules of evidence are relaxed, the right to confrontation is
limited, the burden of proof is far lower than the usual beyond
a reasonable doubt standard, and the right to a trial by jury is
non-existent. The outcome of this violation hearing will often
obviate the relevance of any trial on the new charge. A
probationer facing such a violation hearing, with its quite
limited prospect for a successful outcome, will most often
simply admit to the new charge, whether innocent or not.
This Article will explore each of these consequences in
depth and provide some ideas for constructive ways to avoid
them. In Part II, the Article will describe the evolution of
probation from its roots as a condition imposed upon a select
population of criminal defendants who seemed likely to benefit
from assistance, support, and supervision, to the default
sentence imposed upon a majority of defendants with little to
no regard for whether probation makes sense for that
defendant. As our prison population grows larger and larger, a
relatively small amount of our corrections budget is designated
for probation departments, resulting in minimal or, in many
cases, no supervision or provision of services to an exploding
probation population. We have overwhelmed probation
departments so that they cannot possibly perform the function
that we hope they might. Recognizing this, we have abandoned
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any prospect that probation might assist a defendant’s
rehabilitation and now use it simply as a noose around an
offender’s neck, waiting for the inevitable violation. Not
surprisingly, recidivism and failure to adhere to the technical
requirements of probation have created a burgeoning prison
population. Having placed an offender on probation, a court
often feels compelled to respond to a violation with
incarceration in order to maintain credibility. And, in that
fashion, probation imposed upon a defendant who never needed
programmatic support and supervision, or who needed it but
never got it, turns a case that never merited incarceration into
an incarceration case. In the process, we have created a cycle
out of which many defendants never emerge, preventing them
from obtaining jobs and decent housing.
Part III of this Article will detail the probation violation
process, explaining how the process has largely taken over the
criminal justice system, eradicating some of the constitutional
rights and protections that we hold most dear. We have created
a second class of citizens—those on probation—for whom the
Constitution no longer applies in any meaningful way. The
rights and protections inherent in our legal system, developed
and refined over the past two centuries, are relegated to the
caboose of a train driven by the probation violation process.
The end result is often that any interaction whatsoever with
the criminal justice system can escalate into incarceration,
which means that those most likely to have low-level
interactions with the criminal justice system—the urban poor
and people of color—will suffer disproportionately.
Part IV will suggest a return to an earlier time when
probation was used with a specific purpose in mind, reserved
for those defendants who can truly benefit from support and
supervision. In order to allow probation to engage in
meaningful support and supervision, the number of
probationers each probation officer is expected to supervise
must be drastically reduced. One means of accomplishing this,
of course, would be a significant expansion in funding allowing
for the hiring of many more probation officers. In today’s
economic and political climate, however, the likelihood of
greater funding for probation on the scale that would be
required is simply unrealistic. Although these concepts are not
mutually exclusive, a more feasible and realistic approach
would entail a significant reduction in the number of
probationers. This reduction can be accomplished by ending the
concept of unsupervised probation and by significantly
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expanding the use of other alternative sentencing options. If we
move beyond the “probation-as-default” approach of the last
few decades and return to using probation only when actual
support and supervision are merited, we can accomplish
several crime control objectives and avoid unnecessary fiscal
and human costs.
Finally, Part V of this Article will propose changes to
the probation violation process to enhance the fairness and
reliability of the criminal justice system. To maintain the
integrity of the criminal justice system, we must stop using
probation as a means of engaging in an end-run around the
system’s mechanisms for protecting the rights of defendants.
Except under extraordinary circumstances, the hearing
concerning an alleged probation violation predicated on a new
criminal charge should not be held before the resolution of the
new charge. If the probationer is acquitted of the new charge or
the new charge is dismissed, the violation allegation should
likewise be dismissed. If the probationer is convicted of or
admits to a new charge, he or she can be sentenced on the
probation violation accordingly. By sequencing the events in
this fashion, we can avoid the use of the probation violation
hearing as a substitute for a trial. In so doing, we can restore
some of the public’s eroded faith in the fairness and integrity of
the system.
II.

FROM POSITIVE REHABILITATIVE TOOL TO LOST
OPPORTUNITY

A.

The Origins of Probation

The origins of probation in the United States can be
traced to a Boston cobbler named John Augustus, referred to as
the “father of probation.” In the 1840s, Augustus intervened in
the Massachusetts court system on behalf of thousands of
“common drunkards” and “petty criminals.”2 The prevailing
penal philosophy of the eighteenth century was quite severe,
suggesting that the only response to criminal behavior was
harsh corporal punishment.3 Reforms during the early
2

See 1 NEIL P. COHEN, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE § 1:3 (2d ed.
1999); PAUL F. CROMWELL, JR. ET AL., PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 10 (2d ed. 1985); Wayne A. Logan, The Importance of Purpose in
Probation Decision Making, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 171, 174-75 (2003).
3
COHEN, supra note 2, § 1:2; CROMWELL, supra note 2, at 5.
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nineteenth century focused on the replacement of corporal
punishment with incarceration.4 Augustus’s intervention was
part of a larger reform movement that questioned the
retributive orientation of the criminal justice system and
sought a greater focus on the rehabilitation of the offender.
Augustus’s view was that the purpose of the criminal law
should be “to reform criminals and to prevent crime, and not to
punish maliciously or from a spirit of revenge.”5
Early on, Augustus’s efforts were roundly criticized as
being soft on crime and encouraging criminal behavior.6 But
due in part to the widespread recognition that prisons were not
serving any rehabilitative purpose and in part to Augustus’s
early successes, the concept of probation became more popular
and more widely accepted. In 1878, Massachusetts passed the
first probation statute, followed quickly by a number of other
states.7 By 1925, all forty-eight states and the federal
government formally adopted probation by statute.8
Although Augustus supervised over two thousand
probationers in his eighteen years in the field,9 he chose them
carefully, recognizing that probation would not be an
appropriate disposition for every offender. As he described the
process, “Great care was observed, of course, to ascertain
whether the prisoners were promising subjects for probation,
and to this end it was necessary to take into consideration the
previous character of the person, his age, and the influences by
which he would in future be likely to be surrounded.”10 In the
early part of the twentieth century, the prevailing notions of
probation incorporated this selective ideal. A summary of the
professional literature in 1960 described probation as “the
application of modern, scientific case work to specially selected
offenders who are placed by the court under the personal
supervision of a probation officer . . . and given treatment

4

COHEN, supra note 2, § 1:2; CROMWELL, supra note 2, at 5.
CROMWELL, supra note 2, at 11 (quoting JOHN AUGUSTUS, A REPORT OF
THE LABORS OF JOHN AUGUSTUS 23 (1852)).
6
Id.; Logan, supra note 2, at 176; Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United
States, 22 CRIME & JUST. 149, 155-56 (1997) [hereinafter Petersilia, Probation].
7
Logan, supra note 2, at 175.
8
CROMWELL, supra note 2, at 12.
9
Logan, supra note 2, at 175.
10
CROMWELL, supra note 2, at 10 (quoting JOHN AUGUSTUS, A REPORT OF
THE LABORS OF JOHN AUGUSTUS 34 (1852)).
5
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aimed at their complete and permanent social rehabilitation.”11
The expansion of probation coincided with a significant shift in
the prevailing philosophy of the criminal justice system away
from retribution and in the direction of reform and
rehabilitation. In 1949, the United States Supreme Court
recognized the magnitude of the attitudinal shift: “Retribution
is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law.
Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become
important goals of criminal jurisprudence.”12
The second half of the twentieth century brought with it
a number of developments. Perhaps the most notable was the
abandonment of the notion that probation was a disposition
that should be reserved for specially selected offenders. The
newly minted Model Penal Code suggested a “probation-asdefault” approach to criminal sentencing, suggesting that all
cases should be resolved with probation unless incarceration
was absolutely necessary for public protection.13 Similarly, the
American Bar Association’s Standards for Criminal Justice
suggested that “the automatic response in a sentencing
situation ought to be probation, unless particular aggravating
factors emerge in the case at hand.”14 What followed was a
substantial expansion of the probation population15 as
probation quickly became “the most common form of criminal
sentencing in the United States.”16 Between the 1950s and the
1970s, probation “evolved in relative obscurity” until published
reports in the 1970s exposed the massive underfunding of
probation departments and criticized the utility of probation as
a criminal disposition.17
B.

Probation in the Modern Era

In what many view as a watershed event, sociologist
Robert Martinson in 1974 published a meta-analysis of over
two hundred evaluations of rehabilitative programs, famously
11

Logan, supra note 2, at 180 n.42 (alteration in original) (quoting Lewis
Diana, What is Probation?, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POL. SCI. 189, 197 (1960)).
12
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949).
13
See Logan, supra note 2, at 181-87 (detailing the creation of the Model
Penal Code provisions relating to probation).
14
AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION, Introduction (1970).
15
Logan, supra note 2, at 187.
16
Petersilia, Probation, supra note 6, at 149.
17
Id. at 157.
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concluding that “nothing works.”18 While the scholarly
community expressed serious concerns about the methodology
employed19 and even Martinson himself tried later to qualify his
conclusions,20 Martinson’s “nothing works” conclusion “quickly
caught on with the public and politicians”21 and became “the
rallying cry of a new generation of criminologists.”22 By the end
of the 1980s, the abandonment of the rehabilitative ideal in
favor of a retributive model of criminal justice was all but
complete.23
With the end of the rehabilitative ideal came an
extraordinary
and
unprecedented
movement
toward
incarceration. Criminologist Michael Tonry describes in stark
terms “the modern American preoccupation with absolute
severity of punishment and the related widespread view that
only imprisonment counts.”24 As a consequence, the United
States incarcerates a higher percentage of its citizens for a
greater average duration than any other western nation.25 The
prison and jail population in the United States increased
nearly seven-fold from 1970 to the early twenty-first century,26
with much of that growth coming in the 1990s and beyond. As
of 2008, over 2.2 million Americans, one in every 131 people,
were incarcerated.27 More than one in ten black males aged 2529 was in prison or jail.28
One might think that the abandonment of the
rehabilitative ideal and the increased reliance on incarceration
would have foreshadowed the end of probation as a primary
sentencing mode, but such was not to be the case. As the
incarceration rates have grown, so too have the rates of
defendants being placed on probation. The probation
18

Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison
Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22, 48-49 (1974).
19
See Robert A. Shearer & Patricia Ann King, Multicultural Competencies in
Probation—Issues and Challenges, FED. PROBATION, June 2004, at 3.
20
See Robert Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution
Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 243, 244 (1979).
21
Logan, supra note 2, at 190.
22
Shearer & King, supra note 19, at 3.
23
See William D. Burrell, Trends in Probation and Parole in the States, in
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, BOOK OF THE STATES 2005 595, 597 (2005).
24
MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 128 (1996).
25
Id.; THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACTS ABOUT PRISONS AND PRISONERS
(2009), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/inc_
factsaboutprisons_Dec2009.pdf.
26
Logan, supra note 2, at 190; THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 25.
27
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 25.
28
Id.
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population in the United States almost tripled between 1980
and 1997, from just over one million to more than three
million,29 and that growth has continued unabated. By 2002,
the number had climbed to over four million, a 30% increase
between 1995 and 2002, and has since continued upward,
reaching nearly 4.3 million in 2007.30 Probation cases accounted
for over half of the growth in the entire correctional population
between 1995 and 2006,31 and made up three quarters of the
growth in the number of offenders under community
supervision in 2007.32 Projections predict continued growth.33
Within the adult population in the United States, 1.78% are
presently on probation.34 The massive expansion of probation
appears to be explained in many jurisdictions largely by prison
overcrowding and insufficient funds to support further
incarceration.35
This extraordinary expansion of the probation system
has not been accompanied by any correlating expansion in
funding. As the number of probationers continues to rise in
staggering proportions, spending on probation has been
“stagnant or decreasing.”36 From 1977 to 1990 the number of
probationers essentially tripled in size but spending as a
percentage of governmental budgets did not change.37 During
the same period, spending for prisons and jails doubled.38
“Despite the fact that they handle the vast majority of the
offender population, probation and parole receive less than ten

29

COHEN, supra note 2, § 1:1 n.2.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 228230,
PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2008, at 1 (2009) [hereinafter ANNUAL
PROBATION SURVEY, 2008], available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
ppus08.pdf.
31
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 220218,
PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2006, at 1-2 (2007).
32
ANNUAL PROBATION SURVEY, 2008, supra note 30, at 3 tbl.1.
33
Burrell, supra note 23, at 595.
34
ANNUAL PROBATION SURVEY, 2008, supra note 30, at 1. It is interesting to
note for sake of comparison that while 1.78% of the nation’s adult population is on
probation today, in 1980 only 1.12% of that same population was under any
correctional supervision, including jail, prison, probation and parole. Id.
35
See COHEN, supra note 2, § 1:25.
36
Joan Petersilia, A Crime Control Rationale for Reinvesting in Community
Corrections, 75 PRISON J. 479, 484 (1995) [hereinafter Petersilia, Crime Control].
37
Id. at 483-84.
38
Id. at 483.
30
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percent of the correctional funding from state and local
governments.”39
Not surprisingly, then, two things have happened over
the past few decades: caseloads for probation officers have
grown exponentially, and the level of actual support and
supervision has declined nearly to the point of non-existence.
In the era when probation was viewed as a legitimate
rehabilitative enterprise, recommendations for probation
officer adult caseloads ranged from the 1967 President’s Crime
Commission recommendation of thirty probationers40 to what
the American Bar Association in 1970 called the “widely
recognized standard” of fifty probationers.41 More recent reports
estimate national caseloads averaging as high as 250
probationers per officer.42 In data published in 1999, Rhode
Island had the highest reported average of any state in the
country with an average of over 350 probationers per
supervising probation officer.43
As caseloads have skyrocketed, supervision has
precipitously declined. For significant numbers of probationers,
probation means complete freedom from supervision. On the
national level, the percentage of probationers who are even
required to report to a probation officer declined from 79% in
1995 to 70% in 2005.44 Locally, things appear to be much worse
in the urban areas where most offenders live. A 1995 study of
the probation system in Los Angeles, reporting caseloads in the
hundreds, concluded that at least 60% of all probationers
received no services or supervision of any kind.45 A similar
study in Texas revealed that 95% of the 400,000 adults on
probation were required to report only once every three
months.46 A probation officer testifying in California in 1993,
acknowledging that more than half of the probationers on his
39

Burrell, supra note 23, at 596; see also Petersilia, Crime Control, supra
note 36, at 484.
40
See Petersilia, Crime Control, supra note 36, at 484.
41
AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, supra note 14, at Standard 6.1 cmt.
42
Petersilia, Probation, supra note 6, at 167.
43
AM. PROB. & PAROLE ASS’N, app. 1 tbl.11 (on file with author) (citing C.G.
CAMP & G.M. CAMP, THE CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK 1999: ADULT CORRECTIONS (1999)).
44
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 215091,
PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2005, at 6 tbl.3 (2006) [hereinafter
ANNUAL PROBATION SURVEY, 2005], available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/ppus05.pdf.
45
Petersilia, Crime Control, supra note 36, at 484; Petersilia, Probation,
supra note 6, at 169.
46
Petersilia, Crime Control, supra note 36, at 484.
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caseload were completely unsupervised, summarized the
situation quite starkly:
On each judicial day hundreds of California judges sentence
thousands of offenders to probation, sternly enumerating the many
conditions of probation that are enforced by the probation officer.
Unfortunately, virtually all of these offenders will never see a
probation officer and there will be absolutely no enforcement of the
court ordered conditions. Equally unfortunate is that all of the
players in this drama—especially the offender—understand that the
offenders will go unsupervised.47

As a consequence of underfunding and growing caseloads,
“probation supervision in many large jurisdictions amounts to
simply monitoring for rearrest.”48
C.

A Shift in the Underlying Philosophy of Probation

These trends in probation—exploding caseloads, little to
no supervision—have been accompanied by a corresponding
change in the prevailing philosophy undergirding and
governing probation supervision. Because the history of
probation is firmly rooted in the rehabilitative ideal,
abandoning that ideal while at the same time increasing
reliance on the use of probation required an adjustment in
thinking. A “Justice Model” of probation, in which the primary
focus of probation is retribution, emerged in the 1980s and
remains dominant to this day.49 The decision to place an
offender on probation has become much more likely to be
motivated by a desire to exact retribution for criminal conduct
while, at the same time, avoiding the state expense of
incarceration.50 With the widespread adoption of the “nothing
works” mantra, there is no real expectation of rehabilitation.
Probation has shifted from being viewed as an alternative to
punishment, supplemented with services and support, to being
considered a punishment in and of itself, supplemented with
obligations and restrictions on freedom.51 Even the American
47

Id. at 486 (quoting testimony of Robert Kelgord before the Commission on
the Future of the California Courts, 1993).
48
Id.; see also Robin Campbell & Robert V. Wolf, Problem-Solving Probation:
An Overview of Four Community Based Experiments, TEX. J. CORRECTIONS, Aug. 2001,
at 8, 9 (noting that “at best, a handful of probationers may get the necessary referrals
and support to guide them on a path of reform while the vast majority live in the
community with virtually no supervision”).
49
COHEN, supra note 2, § 1:5; CROMWELL, supra note 2, at 111.
50
COHEN, supra note 2, §§ 1:9, 1:25.
51
Id. at § 1:6; Logan, supra note 2, at 196.
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Bar Association in its 1994 Standards for Criminal Justice
abandoned the term “probation” in favor of the term
“compliance programs.”52 The justice model “repudiates the
notion that probation is a sanction designed to rehabilitate
offenders in the community, and presents the concept that a
sentence of probation represents a proportionate punishment
lawfully administered for certain prescribed crimes.”53 Along
those lines, the justice model “holds that current practices of
counseling, surveillance, and reporting accomplish very little
and have minimal impact on recidivism. On the other hand,
probation that consists of monitoring court orders for victim
restitution or community service and ensures that the imposed
deprivation of liberty is carried out, represents a clear and
achievable task.”54
The adoption of the justice model brought with it a
major change in both the staffing and the philosophy of
probation departments. Traditionally, probation officers most
commonly came from social work backgrounds.55 They often
referred to themselves as “probation counselors” and to the
probationers as “clients.” Under the justice model, the
probation officer is much more likely to come from a law
enforcement background, to call himself or herself a “probation
officer,” and to refer to probationers as “offenders.”56 These
changes in staffing and in language are reflective of the move
away from the rehabilitative model and firmly in the direction
of a retributive model.
Viewing probation through a law enforcement
perspective rather than a social work perspective has
consequences, of course. If probation is about complying with
conditions as a form of punishment, then noncompliance must
be penalized if the system is to maintain any credibility.57 And
that penalty is frequently incarceration.58 Two broad categories
of offenders now flood the prison system: probationers who
have failed to comply with some condition of probation—called
“technical violators”—and probationers who have been
52

AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING § 18-3.13 cmt. (3d ed. 1994).
53
CROMWELL, supra note 2, at 111.
54
Id. at 111-12.
55
Id. at 105-07.
56
See id. at 105-12.
57
See TONRY, supra note 24, at 101-02.
58
See Petersilia, Probation, supra note 6, at 193.
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rearrested on a new criminal allegation.59 With an almost
complete absence of programmatic support or supervision, the
fact that each of these categories is substantial ought not be
terribly surprising. “Stated simply, offenders who fail while
under community supervision constitute the fastest growing
component of the prison and jail populations in this country.”60
One study reports that probation violators represented 17% of
prison admissions nationally in 1980 but by 1999 had doubled
to 35%.61 Another study placed the figure at between 30% and
50% of new admissions.62 Some state figures are substantially
greater, reaching as high as 80% of new admissions.63 Because
of the intractable nature of many of the causes of violations,
“these revocation processes result in ‘churning,’ in which
individuals repeatedly circulate in and out of custody . . . . It
has become increasingly clear to correctional administrators
and policymakers alike that this is a costly and
counterproductive approach.”64 It has become equally clear that
the “high failure rates of probationers and parolees . . .
contribute significantly to prison crowding.”65 Something clearly
must be done to reverse this path.
III.

THE PERVERSION OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS

A.

The Probation Violation Cycle

The fact that our prisons are being flooded with
probation violators begs the question of how all of those
probation violators were sentenced to jail time. The reality is
that we have designed a shadow criminal justice system in
which probationers can be sent to prison on little evidence and
with little procedural protection. Record numbers of offenders
are placed on probation each and every year, with probation
59

See id. at 166; Petersilia, Crime Control, supra note 36, at 488.
Faye S. Taxman & James M. Byrne, Locating Absconders: Results from a
Randomized Field Experiment, FED. PROBATION, Mar. 1994, at 13, 13, see also
Petersilia, Crime Control, supra note 36, at 488.
61
RYAN S. KING, CHANGING DIRECTION?: STATE SENTENCING REFORMS 20042006, at 11 (The Sentencing Project 2007), available at http://www.sentencingproject.
org/doc/publications/sentencingreformforweb.pdf.
62
Petersilia, Crime Control, supra note 36, at 488.
63
See Petersilia, Probation, supra note 6, at 166 (noting that Texas reported
that 66% of all prison admissions in 1993 were probation or parole violators, while
California reported a rate of over 60% and Oregon a rate of over 80%).
64
KING, supra note 61, at 11.
65
Petersilia, Crime Control, supra note 36, at 488.
60
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serving as the default sentence for any offender who cannot or
will not be incarcerated as an immediate consequence of the
court’s adjudication of the case. In some jurisdictions, almost
every misdemeanor is resolved by placing the offender on
probation. If the offender sees a probation officer at all—and
very many will not—the visit alone will be an end, not a means,
of establishing compliance with the terms of probation. Failing
to keep that appointment will result in the filing of a technical
violation of probation. If there are special conditions attached
to the term of probation, the offender will generally be expected
to provide some evidence of compliance with those conditions.
Because the probation officer has an unmanageable number of
probationers to supervise, it is unlikely that any support
services beyond referrals to underfunded or unavailable service
providers will be offered or received. In the absence of available
services, evidence of some effort to obtain services, even if
wholly unsuccessful, will often be deemed as compliance.
Absent an arrest on a new charge, the probationer will be
deemed to have successfully completed the probationary term if
he or she can comply with these minimal obligations.
What of the probationer who cannot or does not comply
with these obligations? The technical violator—the probationer
who fails to appear for a scheduled appointment, fails a drug
test, or fails to fulfill a special condition—will in all likelihood
be brought before the sentencing court as a probation violator.
Although the original criminal charge did not merit a jail
sentence and the probationer has not been charged with
engaging in new criminal activity, it is more likely than not
that the probationer will now be incarcerated, at great expense
to the government, and often for an extraordinarily long period
of time.66 If the goal of the probationary sentence was to deter
future criminal behavior, it is hard to justify incarceration in
the absence of criminal behavior. The consequence of a
probationer’s failure to meet what are often unrealistic
expectations can frequently be a prison sentence far in excess
of what anyone would ever have thought justified by the
original criminal charge.67 In what might be viewed as a classic
66

See TONRY, supra note 24, at 105.
Criminologist Michael Tonry, in his book entitled Sentencing Matters,
explores the argument that the high rates of technical violations of probation simply
“expose the unreality and injustice of conditions—like prohibitions of drinking or
expectations that offenders will conform to middle-class behavioral standards they
have never observed before—that many offenders will foreseeably breach and that do
not involve criminality. Many offenders have difficulty in achieving conventional, law67
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example of this scenario, a defendant in Arkansas who had
been convicted of theft was eventually sentenced to five years
in prison solely for failing to report to his probation officer as
required.68 The defendant, who had been given permission to
leave the state to look for work, explained that he had “moved a
lot . . . looking for work, and that he could not always get the
report, a stamp, and an envelope together.”69 The Court of
Appeals of Arkansas upheld the five year sentence.70 In just this
fashion, we often dedicate scarce prison resources to a failed
probationer who committed a minor or non-violent crime rather
than to an offender who committed a far more serious offense.
But even more disturbing is the treatment of the
probationer who is charged with a new crime. In many
jurisdictions this probationer will be incarcerated as a matter
of practice or as a matter of law while he or she awaits a
probation violation hearing, whether or not the new charge
merits incarceration.71 In all likelihood this probationer will end
up incarcerated as a probation violator as a result of the new
criminal allegation, and this remains the case even if the new
charge is ultimately dismissed or, worse, even if he or she is
ultimately acquitted on that charge after a trial.72 Most
frequently the probation violation allegation will be used as a
vehicle to force a resolution of the new criminal charge, leaving
that charge completely untested by the normal adjudicative
process.

abiding patterns of living and many stumble along the way.” Id. He points out that a
“traditional social work approach to community corrections would expect and accept
the stumbles (so long as they do not involve significant new crimes) and hope that
through them, with help, the offender will learn to be law-abiding.” Id.
68
Luyet v. State, CA CR 81-69, 1981 WL 930, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. Nov. 12,
1981).
69
Id. at *1.
70
Id. at *2. Similarly, in Morgan v. State, 588 S.W.2d 431 (Ark. 1979), the
court upheld a three year prison sentence for a defendant who had pled guilty to
forgery and who, while on probation, moved out of state without permission to obtain
employment.
71
Most efforts by probationers to be released while they await a hearing are
unsuccessful. Because there is no constitutional presumption of innocence at a
probation revocation proceeding, absent a statute allowing judges the discretion to
grant bail, probationers will generally be held until their revocation hearing. COHEN,
supra note 2, §§ 18:5-18:7.
72
Most jurisdictions justify this outcome by noting that the standard of proof
during a probation violation is by a preponderance of the evidence, whereas during a
criminal trial, the standard is beyond a reasonable doubt. The significant gap between
these two standards of proof creates a very high likelihood that a probationer will be
found guilty during a violation hearing even if they are acquitted during criminal
proceedings. Id. § 22:15.
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The honest truth is that the probation violation
mechanism has in many cases completely taken over the
mechanical functioning of criminal justice system. With
unprecedented numbers of offenders on probation at any time,
the likelihood that a defendant charged with a crime is
presently on probation is high.73 In that scenario, the system
lends itself to an end-run around all of the procedural
protections in place to protect the innocent, and the simple
exercise of constitutional rights is punished. The primary
impact of probation on the criminal justice system is the
generation of a shadow criminal justice system in which
procedural protections such as the presumption of innocence
and the right to a jury trial are disregarded and decisions
about incarceration are made essentially by default.
When a probationer is arrested on a new criminal
charge, that person is brought before the court to be arraigned
on the new charge. It is generally at that very same
arraignment that the probationer is generally presented with
the allegation that he or she, by committing the new crime, has
violated his or her probationary terms. Often, there is a heavy
presumption or even a requirement that the probationer will be
incarcerated until the probation violation allegation is
adjudicated.74 In the misdemeanor context, this presumption
can frequently have the effect of coercing an immediate
resolution of both the alleged probation violation and the new
criminal charge.75 If a defendant can avoid further detention
and obtain release from custody only by admitting a violation
and pleading guilty to a new criminal charge, he or she will
almost invariably exercise that option regardless of guilt or
innocence.76
A recent story in the Providence Journal chronicled the
ugly path that the system can follow when a defendant is
placed on probation. A woman engaged in a bitter divorce was
repeatedly arrested and charged with misdemeanor offenses

73

In 2007, one in every forty-five adults in the United States was supervised
in the community and over 80% of those being supervised were on probation. ANNUAL
PROBATION SURVEY, 2008, supra note 30, at 1.
74
See COHEN, supra note 2, §§ 18:5-18:7; ANDREW R. KLEIN, ALTERNATIVE
SENTENCING, INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS AND PROBATION 319 (2d ed. 1997).
75
See KLEIN, supra note 74, at 329.
76
See id.
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based on allegations made by family members.77 On nine
separate occasions she was held without bail as an alleged
probation violator based on those allegations alone, sometimes
for more than a month, until she was ultimately acquitted or
the charge was dismissed.78 It is unclear whether she was ever
offered the opportunity to enter an admission to any of those
charges in order to avoid incarceration; if she had been offered
that chance, she almost certainly would have taken it. It is the
rare defendant indeed who will stay in custody in order to
contest a charge when he or she can be released upon an
admission of guilt.79
With the looming threat of incarceration, the
defendant’s status as a probationer acts as an almost complete
barrier to challenging the veracity of the new criminal
allegation or exercising any of the connected constitutional
rights because the cost of doing so is more than most
defendants can or will bear. While expedient, this process
actually serves no constituency very well. Because the veracity
and accuracy of the charges is unsubstantiated, the innocent
can and do get swept up with the guilty. Because the validity of
arrests and charges goes untested, sloppy or unlawful police
and prosecutorial work gets rewarded. The defendant, unable
to challenge even unjust or untrue charges, accumulates a
criminal history from which he or she is unlikely to recover.
And because what follows from the new charge is almost
invariably yet another term of probation, the defendant walks
closer and closer to that line of incarceration. Eventually, and
often sooner rather than later, a defendant who has never
received any support or social services and whose problems
remain untreated winds up incarcerated on charges that
nobody truly believes merit incarceration. And the injustice of
77

John Hill, Override Urged in Probation-Violation Veto, PROVIDENCE J.,
Dec. 17, 2009, at A13.
78
Id.
79
Another Rhode Island story makes this point in a rather stark fashion,
albeit in the context of an alleged bail violation. Accused by an ex-boyfriend of violating
a restraining order, a special needs teacher in her fifties was released on bail. Bob
Kerr, She Paid When the Law Came Apart, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 12, 2008, at B1. When
the ex-boyfriend made another unsupported allegation, she faced the choice of
admitting guilt to obtain her release or asserting her innocence enduring two weeks of
incarceration to contest the charge. Id. On the day of her arraignment she initially
asserted her innocence, but then changed her plea to avoid incarceration. Id. Unable to
live with her false admission, she moved to vacate her plea and, when that motion was
granted, she was jailed for two weeks. Id. Ultimately, all of the charges against her
were dismissed. Id.
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this system falls disproportionately upon those for whom
contact with the criminal justice system is most likely as a
matter of sheer probability: the urban poor and people of color.80
Contrast that same scenario with a defendant arrested
on a new misdemeanor charge committed one day after his or
her probation has expired. Because the probationary period has
expired, he or she cannot be presented to the court as a
probation violator and the defendant is likely to be free to
exercise the rights related to challenging the charge without
threat of immediate incarceration. And this is most often true
even if the alleged crime took place while the person was still
on probation.81 So a defendant arrested and brought to court on
a new misdemeanor charge on the last day of his probation can
and most often will be incarcerated without bail unless he
admits to the new criminal charge, while that same defendant
arrested on the same offense but two days later maintains all
80

It is a well documented reality that people of color are more likely to be
stopped by the police and that their encounters with the police are more likely to result
in arrests. Examples abound. The New York City Police Department reported stopping
and searching over 500,000 people in 2007; 86% of those stopped and searched were
black or Latino. Steven Zeidman, Time to End Violation Pleas, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 1, 2008,
at 2. In that same year, the Los Angeles Police Department reported that 34.4% of the
motor vehicle drivers that it stopped were white, while 18.7% were black, and 37.4%
were Hispanic. See Noah Kupferberg, Transparency: A New Role for Police Consent
Decrees, 42 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 129, 164 app. A (2008). While the numbers of
people pulled over appear to have been roughly in proportion to the percentages of each
race stopped, a marked difference existed in the number of motorists asked to exit their
vehicles and subjected to a search. While just 17.0% of the motorists asked to exit were
white, 25.0% were black and 53.2% were Hispanic. Id. at 165 app. A. Similarly, of the
motorists who were searched once outside of their vehicles, only 11.6% were white,
while 31.0% were black and 54.6% were Hispanic. Id. Obviously, more stops and more
searches will result in more arrests. While any encounter between a police officer and a
citizen can escalate into an arrest, people of color are statistically much more likely to
be arrested in that kind of encounter. A recent report in Seattle revealed that AfricanAmericans were eight times more likely than whites to be arrested and charged solely
with the crime of obstruction, known by local law enforcement officers as “contempt of
cop.” Eric Nalder, Lewis Kamb & Daniel Lathrop, ‘Obstructing’ Justice: Blacks Are
Arrested on ‘Contempt of Cop’ Charge at Higher Rate, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Feb. 28, 2008, at A1. In New York City, 87% of the 40,300 people arrested for the
lowest-level misdemeanor marijuana possession in 2008 were black or Latino even
though research suggests that whites are the heaviest users. Jim Dwyer, Whites Smoke
Pot, But Blacks Are Arrested, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2009, at A24.
81
Some jurisdictions have enacted statutes that allow them to retain
jurisdiction for a “reasonable” period of time following the expiration of the probation
period within which hearings can be conducted for violations that occurred while the
defendant was on probation. COHEN, supra note 2, § 18:19. Even in these jurisdictions,
the probation violation hearing is generally avoided if formal revocation proceedings
have not commenced prior to the expiration of the probation period. See United States
v. Barton, 26 F.3d 490, 492 (4th Cir. 1994). In the federal system, for example, unless a
warrant or summons has been issued prior to the expiration of probation, the court
may not revoke a sentence for probation. 18 U.S.C. § 3565(c) (2006).
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of his constitutional rights, including the presumption of
innocence and the right to reasonable bail that will generally
mean his release from custody. Is the enormous distinction in
the treatment of these two defendants justified by any rational
public policy? Is it fair? Does it lead to justice?
If the alleged probation violator has the wherewithal
and the fortitude to seek a probation violation hearing, that
hearing will be one in which virtually all procedural protections
for the accused have been removed.82 The accused enjoys no
right to a trial by jury.83 The rules of evidence are relaxed such
that hearsay may be introduced84 and illegally obtained
evidence may be used.85 The right to confront and crossexamine one’s accusers is a “conditional right” that a judge can
take away.86 The burden of proof upon the prosecution, even if
the allegation is that the probationer committed a new crime,
is significantly reduced.87 In some jurisdictions, for example, the
government must simply offer evidence such that a judge is
“reasonably satisfied” that the probationer has violated a term
or condition of probation.88 A probationer’s ability to obtain
discovery in advance of the probation violation hearing is
limited,89 and because the hearing often takes place before a
trial of the new criminal charge is scheduled, probation
violation hearings “are frequently held without the benefit of
preparation that precedes a criminal trial.”90

82

See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-90 (1973); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483-89 (1972); see also State v. Gautier, 871 A.2d 347, 359 (R.I.
2005) (noting that probation violation defendants “are afforded considerably less due
process protection than that to which they are constitutionally entitled in a full-blown
criminal trial”).
83
COHEN, supra note 2, § 21:49. In fact, revocation hearings may even be
presided over by an “independent officer,” who is often a probation officer not directly
involved in the case. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 486; see also Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 781, 786.
84
COHEN, supra note 2, § 20:11.
85
Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 369 (1998).
86
See Gautier, 871 A.2d at 359; Commonwealth v. Durling, 551 N.E.2d 1193,
1199 (Mass. 1990); see also United States v. Waters, 1998 FED App. 0299P (6th Cir.).
87
KLEIN, supra note 74, at 260-61.
88
Id. at 260 (internal quotation marks omitted).
89
COHEN, supra note 2, §§ 21:29-30. Courts have held that, unlike in a
criminal proceeding where a defendant is entitled to disclosure of evidence if it is
material to his or her case, in a probation violation hearing due process may not be
denied if the government fails to disclose evidence, even potentially exculpatory
evidence, so long as the government does not plan to use that evidence during a
violation proceeding. See United States v. Neal, 512 F.3d 427, 436 (7th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Derewal, 66 F.3d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1995).
90
Commonwealth v. Cosgrove, 629 A.2d 1007, 1011 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
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In practice, unless the prosecution fails to present any
evidence at all, the outcome of a probation violation hearing is
often all but a foregone conclusion. When a probationer is
found after a hearing to have violated the terms of his or her
probation by committing a new crime, that probationer is often
sentenced in a fashion that, in reality, is intended to punish the
probationer for having committed the new crime. While the
sentence is legally justified not as a sentence for the new
offense, but rather as a sentence for violating the terms of
probation,91 any honest assessment of the situation
acknowledges the truth as perceived by all of the relevant
players: the sentence is punishment for the new offense. Often
the severity of the probation violation sentence is sufficient to
allow the government either to offer a disposition on the new
charge with a sentence that functionally merges with the
probation violation sentence, or to forgo the prosecution of the
new charge altogether. The outcome is that the prosecution
gets the sentence it was seeking on the new charge without the
burden of ever having to prove it. There is no need, under this
system, to have a criminal trial, and our entire system of
procedural protections for the accused is left on the sidelines.
Something must be done to correct this abuse and restore the
legitimacy of our criminal justice system.
IV.

ALTERNATIVES TO USING PROBATION AS A DEFAULT
SENTENCE

National reports indicate that as many as 80% of adult
misdemeanor convictions result in sentences of probation.92 The
sheer volume of misdemeanor probationers completely
overwhelms the system, preventing probation from achieving
any measure of effectiveness. It does not have to be this way.
Virtually all jurisdictions employ alternative sentencing
mechanisms besides probation to resolve criminal cases. If
91

See Lucido v. Superior Court, 795 P.2d 1223, 1230 (Cal. 1990) (“The
fundamental role and responsibility of the hearing judge in a revocation proceeding is
not to determine whether the probationer is guilty or innocent of a crime, but whether
a violation of the terms of probation has occurred . . . .”); Gautier, 871 A.2d at 361 (“[A]
probation-revocation hearing is considered a continuation of the original prosecution
for which probation was imposed—in which the sole purpose is to determine whether a
criminal defendant has breached a condition of his existing probation, not to convict
that individual of a new criminal offense.”); Cosgrove, 629 A.2d at 1011 (“It is neither [a
probation hearing’s] purpose nor function to serve as a final arbiter of an individual’s
guilt or innocence of criminal charges.”).
92
Petersilia, Probation, supra note 6, at 173.
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probation is no longer viewed as serving a rehabilitative
function, then presumably probation is being used for its
retributive or deterrent value. Non-probationary sentences,
such as the imposition of time served, of a fine, of community
service, or even of a finding of guilt without further
punishment, can certainly carry as much retributive value as a
probationary period that involves little supervision or, more
commonly, no supervision at all. If the retributive value comes
from conditions that might be attached to probation, those
conditions can be enforced without reliance on probation.
Similarly, the deterrent value of a probationary sentence, if
there is any in fact, can frequently be equaled by the imposition
of a non-probationary sentence.
A.

Debunking the Current Rationales for Probation

As the system presently exists, the stated rationales
supporting the extensive reliance on probation as a sentencing
mechanism do not withstand scrutiny. The primary rationale—
that probation is cheaper than incarceration and that we
simply do not have room in our jails and prisons for all of these
defendants—relies on the premise that most or all of those who
are placed on probation should be incarcerated. When as many
as 80% of all misdemeanor convictions result in a period of
probation, it is clear that these defendants are not being placed
on probation as an alternative to incarceration.93 What the
casual use of probation actually accomplishes for these
defendants is the prospect of incarceration for a probation
violation that would not otherwise exist if the person had not
been placed on probation in the first place. This use of
probation does not drive incarceration costs down, but rather
quite the opposite.
Another rationale for the reliance on probation as a
sentencing mechanism is that probation is a form of retributive
sentence. This might make sense in a context in which
compliance with probation was onerous. If the vast majority of
probationers report rarely or never, and if the level of
supervision is diluted to the point of virtual non-existence, it is
very hard to comprehend how probation exacts a form of
retribution. The honest reality is that for most probationers,
probation serves as little more than a noose around their neck,
93

Id.
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waiting to be tightened when or if they have an encounter with
the law. Any system that relies on a future encounter with the
law as a triggering mechanism will have a grossly
disproportionate impact on the urban poor and people of color.94
As noted above, the retributive value of any conditions that
might be attached to probation can be achieved by imposing
those same conditions without imposing probation.95
Yet another rationale for the reliance on probation as a
sentencing mechanism is the notion that the mere fact that the
offender is on probation will serve as a deterrent to future
criminal conduct. But there are several flaws with this
reasoning. There is very little empirical data supporting the
general notion of deterrence theory with respect to probation.96
Experts agree that a low probability threat of a severe sanction
is not effective.97 For the vast majority of probationers who are
obtaining little to no supervision, a violation of probation will
occur only if there is an arrest for a new offense. Apprehension
for criminal behavior is often a relatively low probability
event.98 To the extent that a crime involves any premeditation
rather than a response to impulse, the offender’s estimation of
the probability of apprehension will certainly be low in an
offender’s mind. Presumably the potential sentence for that
new crime already serves as a deterrent, so the relevant
deterrent value is the differential in deterrence that can be
derived solely from one’s status as a probationer. With a
complete absence of data on this question, it seems relatively

94

See supra note 80.
See supra Part IV.
96
See Petersilia, Probation, supra note 6, at 154-55; Faye S. Taxman,
Supervision—Exploring the Dimensions of Effectiveness, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 2002,
at 14.
97
See COHEN, supra note 2, § 1:7 (citing research suggesting that “certainty
of punishment is a greater deterrent than severity of punishment”); Michael Tonry,
The Functions of Sentencing and Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 37, 52 (2005)
(“Current knowledge concerning deterrence is little different than eighteenth-century
theorists supposed it to be: certainty and promptness of punishment are much more
powerful deterrents than severity.”); Angela Hawken & Mark Kleiman, H.O.P.E. for
Reform: What a Novel Probation Program in Hawaii Might Teach Other States, AM.
PROSPECT, Apr. 10, 2007, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=hope_for_reform
(noting that crime “attracts reckless and impulsive people, for whom deferred and lowprobability threats of severe punishment are less effective than immediate and highprobability threats of mild punishment”).
98
See Tonry, supra note 97, at 53; see also Richard S. Frase, Punishment
Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 79 (2005) (“[T]he detection rates for most crimes are
very low, and the probability of an offender receiving a custody sentence is often less
than one out of every one hundred crimes committed.”).
95
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safe to assume that this differential is minimal if not nonexistent.
The remaining rationale for the heavy reliance on
probation as a sentencing mechanism, if one is honest about
how it works, is that is makes the processing of a future
criminal charge faster and easier for the prosecution. But this
rationale, despite its efficiency, is the one that is so deeply
troubling. It makes for very poor public policy choices in a
variety of ways—not just who we incarcerate and for how long,
but also how quickly we allow offenders to accumulate criminal
records that render them unemployable and ineligible for most
rental housing. And this process serves to seriously undermine
the public perception of the fairness of the system.99
If the legitimate justifications for such extraordinarily
heavy reliance on probation do not hold up, the obvious
solution is to stop using probation as the default non-jail
sentence and start relying more heavily on other non-jail
dispositions, particularly for misdemeanor offenses. This
simple step can help restore the viability and credibility of the
probationary sanction by precipitously reducing caseloads.
With smaller caseloads, real support and supervision is an
attainable goal and there is substantial research suggesting
that it can make a real difference.100 Probation should be
imposed sparingly and deliberately in the way in which it was
historically intended: as a means of providing support and
supervision to those select offenders for whom such support
and supervision seems likely to make a difference. There is
little value in using probation as a means of monitoring an
offender’s performance of an identifiable condition of probation;
that function can be served either directly by the court or by
referral to an outside agency.101 Those offenders who are placed
99

A prime example of the public perception of the probation violation system
can be found in an article published in the Providence Phoenix in 1997, the title of
which tells the reader all he or she needs to know. Jody Ericson, Take a Ride on Rhode
Island’s Revocation Railroad: Make One False Move While on Probation and Go
Directly to Jail, PROVIDENCE PHOENIX, Oct. 3, 1997, at 9. A similar message can be
found a decade later in the magazine Rhode Island Monthly. Guilty, Even While
Innocent, R.I. MONTHLY, Dec. 2008.
100
See infra notes 138-144 and accompanying text.
101
In Rhode Island, a private not-for-profit entity called Justice Assistance
has a contract with the courts to monitor compliance with conditions such as
community service, domestic violence counseling, substance abuse counseling, mental
health counseling, and restitution in cases in which probation is not ordered. See
Justice Assistance, www.justiceassistance.org (last visited March 6, 2010). The agency
reports back to the court to indicate compliance or non-compliance. Id.
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on probation must receive much more than just monitoring, but
also intervention, support, and supervision.
B.

Alternatives to Probation

A wide variety of non-probationary sentences is
available. One common non-probationary sentence is the
“unconditional discharge” found in many state statutes. In New
York, for example, a court may impose a sentence of
unconditional discharge “if the court is of the opinion that no
proper purpose would be served by imposing any condition
upon the defendant’s release.”102 The statutory provision
governing an unconditional discharge in Connecticut uses
precisely the same language.103 In New Hampshire, an
unconditional discharge may be imposed if the court is of the
opinion that neither supervision nor any other condition would
serve a proper purpose.104 The statutes in each of these states
provide that a sentence of unconditional discharge “is for all
purposes a final judgment of conviction.”105
Pennsylvania uses different language to accomplish
essentially the same function, explicitly allowing a court to
impose a sentence of “guilt without further penalty.”106 In other
jurisdictions, a plea of guilty followed by a sentence of “time
served” has the same effect, creating a criminal conviction and
discharging the offender with no further obligations to the
court.107
The statutory sentencing schemes in some states seem
designed to discourage or prevent the overuse of probation by
statute. In New Hampshire, for example, probation is not a
permissible sentence for a Class B misdemeanor and may be
imposed only if the offense is a felony or a Class A
misdemeanor.108 Pennsylvania’s Sentencing Guidelines suggest
102

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.20 (McKinney 2009).
See CONN. GEN. STAT. §53a-34 (2007).
104
See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:2 (VIII) (2007).
105
CONN. GEN. STAT. §53a-34 (b); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:2 (VIII); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 65.20.
106
PA. CONS. STAT. § 9753 (2007).
107
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-7-206 (2009) (providing that the court’s
acceptance of a guilty plea “acts as a conviction for the offense); MINN. STAT. § 609.02,
subd. 5 (2007) (defining a “conviction” as a plea of guilty or a verdict of guilty that is
“accepted and recorded by the court”); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 1.20(13) (McKinney 2009)
(defining a “conviction” as “the entry of a plea of guilty to, or a verdict of guilty upon,
an accusatory instrument”).
108
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:2 (I), (III).
103
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“the use of the least restrictive, non-confinement sentencing
alternatives” appropriate to the case, including the
“determination of guilt without further penalty.”109 Maine has
gone much further, prohibiting the use of probation as a
sentence in the majority of misdemeanor cases and making a
sentence of unconditional discharge the default sentence even
in those situations where probation is permissible.110 The Maine
statute provides that a court may impose probation as a
sentence only if it affirmatively finds that “the person is in
need of the supervision, guidance, assistance or direction that
probation can provide.”111 In the alternative, an offender “for
whom the court determines that no other authorized
sentencing alternative is appropriate punishment must be
sentenced by the court to an unconditional discharge.”112 The
adoption of these sentencing policies in Maine made an
enormous difference in a very short period of time, with the
number of probationers under supervision declining by over
one-third between 2004 and 2007.113 During the same time
frame the percentage of prison inmates incarcerated in Maine
on a probation violation declined from 30% of the prison
population to 25%.114 By 2005, Maine was among the top ten
states in the country with the smallest percentage of its adult
population under probation supervision.115 In New York,
substantial use of the sentence of “time served” has helped
keep probation numbers quite low.116 Statewide in 2007, more
than 12% of misdemeanor convictions in New York were

109

10A PA. PRACTICE SERIES § 27:14, Driving Under the Influence (2009).
See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1201 (2009).
111
Id. § 1201(2).
112
Id. § 1346 (emphasis added). The commentary to § 1201 notes that
“probation should be used if it appears that the convicted person would be helped
thereby” but that, “[a]bsent such a need, an unconditional discharge is warranted.” Id.
§ 1201 cmt.
113
MARK RUBIN, TARGETED INTERVENTIONS COULD EASE MAINE’S PRISON AND
JAIL POPULATIONS (2008), available at http://muskie.usm.maine.edu/justiceresearch/Pu
blications/Adult/Targeted_Interventions_Could_Ease_ME_Prison_Jail_Population.pdf.
114
Id.
115
ANNUAL PROBATION SURVEY, 2005, supra note 44, at 3 tbl.1.
116
Like Maine, in 2005 New York was among the top ten states in the country
with the smallest percentage of its adult population under probation supervision. Id.
As will be developed elsewhere, this status can also be attributed to the widespread use
of conditional discharge sentences and the imposition of fines. See infra notes 123-128
and accompanying text.
110
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resolved with a sentence of time served,117 while in New York
City the percentage exceeded 17%.118
The retributive and deterrent value of an unconditional
discharge, a sentence of guilt without further penalty, or a
sentence of time served is clear. In all of the statutory schemes
cited above, the imposition of a sentence creates a criminal
conviction. The mere fact of the criminal conviction carries all
of the same retributive characteristics of a period of probation
that entails no supervision. The criminal conviction is a matter
of public record and available for all of the world to see. The
stigma connected with being a convicted criminal is equally
poignant without the accompanying period of probation, as are
the adverse consequences for future employment and housing.
And the fact of the conviction remains accessible and available
for use against the defendant in any future court proceeding or
sentence. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania acknowledged
this general logic some time ago:
In some instances, the court may decide that the needs of justice are
fulfilled by a determination of guilt alone, without necessity for
further penalty. The shame and trauma of public conviction may be
punishment enough and there may be no need of any plan for
‘reformation’ or control. In such cases, the courts should be free to
make such a judgment without requiring useless probation.119

Whatever deterrent value may be served by an offender’s
awareness that the commission and detection of a new crime
while on probation may carry an enhanced penalty—and there
is no available evidence to suggest that such deterrent value
even exists—can be replicated by a more intelligent graduated
sentencing scheme for repeat offenders.
The unconditional discharge is, of course, far from the
only way to achieve the desired result of reducing excess
reliance on probation while at the same time imposing a
sentence that has retributive and deterrent value. Most states
list a variety of alternative non-jail sentences in their array of
sentencing possibilities, including community service,
restitution, various counseling or educational regimens, and
117

N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, DISPOSITION OF ADULT
ARRESTS, NEW YORK STATE 5 (2009), available at http://www.criminaljustice.state.ny.
us/crimnet/ojsa/dispos/nys.pdf [hereinafter DISPOSITION OF ADULT ARRESTS, NEW YORK
STATE].
118
Id.
119
Commonwealth v. Rubright, 414 A.2d 106, 109 (Pa. 1980) (quoting S. TOLL,
PENNSYLVANIA CRIMES CODE ANNOTATED § 1323 (Supp. 1978)).
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fines. These conditions can and do have retributive value.
Indeed, for many offenders a community service obligation is
much more onerous than a period of probation, particularly if
that probation is essentially unsupervised.120 Research studies
have concluded that, as measured by recidivism rates, a
community service sentence has no less deterrent value than a
sentence of probation.121 Each of these sorts of conditions can be
monitored either directly by the court through a future court
appearance or through some outside agency without any need
for probationary supervision. Indeed, the use of a probationary
sentence to accomplish nothing more than monitoring of
compliance with a specific condition is one of the primary
reasons that probation has been so grossly overused.
The easiest mechanism for overseeing the imposition of
a specific alternative sanction is the use of the “conditional
discharge.” In New York, for example,
[A] court may impose a sentence of conditional discharge for an
offense if the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of
the offense and to the history, character and condition of the
defendant, is of the opinion that neither the public interest nor the
ends of justice would be served by a sentence of imprisonment and
that probation supervision is not appropriate.122

Other states have quite similar provisions. In New Hampshire,
for example, a defendant “may be sentenced to a period of
conditional discharge if such person is not imprisoned and the
court is of the opinion that probationary supervision is
unnecessary, but that the defendant’s conduct should be
according to conditions determined by the court.”123
Reliance on non-probationary alternative sentences has
allowed some jurisdictions to keep their probation rates
relatively under control. In 2007, almost one-third of all
misdemeanor convictions in the state of New York resulted in a
sentence of conditional discharge.124 When added to the
misdemeanor cases resolved by sentences of time served and
those resolved with the imposition of a fine, the total
percentage of misdemeanor convictions resolved without resort
120

Michael Tonry, describing alternative sentencing in Europe, reports that
“In law and in practice, CSOs (community service orders) are regarded in England as
more intrusive and punitive than probation.” TONRY, supra note 24, at 122.
121
Id. at 122-23.
122
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.05 (1)(a) (2009).
123
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:2 (VI)(a) (2007).
124
See DISPOSITION OF ADULT ARRESTS, NEW YORK STATE, supra note 117, at 5.
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to probation or incarceration was just under 75%.125 Fewer than
5% of misdemeanor convictions resulted in probationary
sentences.126 In New York City the numbers were even more
pronounced, with over 40% of misdemeanor convictions being
resolved with a conditional discharge and not even 1%
sentenced to probation.127 Not surprisingly, then, in 2005 New
York was listed among the top ten states in the country with
the lowest percentage of its adult population under
probationary supervision.128 And the vast majority of those
adults on probation appear to be on probation for felony
offenses, presumably a much wiser use of the limited
supervisory resources available to the probation department.
Similarly, as noted earlier, Maine has achieved substantial
reductions in number of probationers by prohibiting the use of
probation as a misdemeanor sentence except on a select
category of misdemeanors.129
Data in North Carolina indicate that of all cases
resolved with a sentence defined as “community punishment”
only one-third were sentenced to a period of supervised
probation.130 Despite that fact, North Carolina’s percentage of
adults on probation is nearly as high as the national average.131
This anomalous result may be explained by what appears to be
a quite unfortunate and ill-advised reliance on unsupervised
probation, which is imposed in 44% of community punishment
cases.132 That undue reliance may in turn be explained by the
Criminal Code Commission’s rejection of a recommendation to
include unconditional discharge as a sentencing option.133 If the
high volume of unsupervised probation cases were excluded,
the percentage of adults being supervised by probation officers
would presumably be significantly reduced.
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Id.
Id.
127
See DISPOSITION OF ADULT ARRESTS, NEW YORK CITY, supra note 118, at 5.
128
ANNUAL PROBATION SURVEY, 2005, supra note 44, at 3 tbl.1.
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See supra notes 110-115 and accompanying text.
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N.C. SENTENCING AND POLICY ADVISORY COMM’N, STRUCTURED
SENTENCING STATISTICAL REPORT FOR FELONIES AND MISDEMEANORS 50-51 (Feb.
2008), available at http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/spac/Documents/
06-07statisticalreport.pdf.
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ANNUAL PROBATION SURVEY, 2005, supra note 44, at 3 tbl.1.
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N.C. SENTENCING AND POLICY ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 130, at 50-51.
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The Potential Benefits of Reform

A substantial reduction in probation caseloads,
particularly on the misdemeanor level, can have significant
crime control ramifications with what would seem to be very
little to no risk of adverse consequences. National statistics
reveal that 75% of misdemeanor probationers complete their
period of probation without violation.134 Since the majority of
these probationers receive little to no support or supervision,
one logical conclusion is that these offenders were not in need
of any supervision.135 If that is the case, any potential benefits of
the probationary sentence would seem to be far outstripped by
the costs.136 The costs of placing enormous numbers of
misdemeanor defendants on probation are very real. There are
administrative and transactional costs connected to each
probationer, even if he or she is totally unsupervised.137 For
those probationers who do not succeed, there are costs
connected to the entire violation process as well as to the
potential escalation of a non-jail case into incarceration. With
each failure the reputation of probation as a potentially
effective crime control mechanism suffers. But perhaps most
importantly, the opportunity cost—in both human and
financial terms—connected with failing to provide actual
support and supervision in a fashion that has some possibility
of efficacy is immeasurable.
Despite the popularity of the “nothing works”
philosophy that first took hold in the 1970s, in fact there is a
great deal of evidence that the provision of support services
and supervision can work quite well in reducing recidivism and
helping to control crime. The study that created the “nothing
works” furor came under persistent and compelling attack from
the moment of its publication. As a National Academy of
Sciences Panel concluded in reevaluating the original “nothing
works” study just three years after its publication, “when it is
134

See COHEN, supra note 2, § 1:23 n.3; Petersilia, Probation, supra note 6, at

180-81.
135

Another logical conclusion may be that some of these probationers violated
their probation but the violations went undetected. The higher the number of
probationers in this category, the less value probation would seem to have as any sort
of deterrent to future criminality.
136
See Petersilia, Probation, supra note 6, at 181 (questioning “the wisdom of
placing such low-risk persons on probation in the first place” because the costs appear
to outstrip the benefits).
137
Id.
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asserted that ‘nothing works,’ the panel is uncertain as to just
what has even been given a fair trial.”138 The programs that
made up the basis of the “nothing works” study were “often not
only underfunded and understaffed, but typically staffed by
poorly trained and often unmotivated people.”139
More recent research strongly supports the proposition
that support services and supervision can have a meaningful
impact on recidivism. In a leading study published in 1987,
Professors Paul Gendreau and Robert Ross surveyed over 200
studies on rehabilitative programs, concluding that “successful
rehabilitation of offenders had been accomplished, and
continued to be accomplished quite well.”140 They found that
“reductions in recidivism, sometimes as substantial as 80
percent, had been achieved in a considerable number of wellcontrolled studies.”141 Research continuing on through the
1990s, now known as the “what works” literature, consistently
found similar results.142 In the case of drug addicted offenders,
there is “rather solid empirical evidence that ordering offenders
into treatment, and getting them to participate, reduces
recidivism.”143 But these reductions in recidivism were seen only
in “programs in which offenders both received surveillance
(e.g., drug tests) and participated in relevant treatment.”144
The plain reality is that probation can have a
rehabilitative impact only if we return to the rational and
judicious use of probation as a criminal sanction, allowing
probation officers to engage constructively with probationers.
That requires a manageable case load that can involve actual
interaction and supervision, complete with referrals to viable
treatment programs and adequate follow up to assure
compliance. The lost opportunity to have a meaningful impact
on an offender’s prospects for rehabilitation cannot be justified.
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See Miller, supra note 1.
Id. (quoting criminologist Elliott Currie).
140
Paul Gendreau & Robert R. Ross, Revivification of Rehabilitation: Evidence
from the 1980s, 4 JUST. Q. 349, 350-51 (1987).
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See generally WHAT WORKS?: REDUCING REOFFENDING (James McGuire
ed., 1995).
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THE RETURN TO A SYSTEM THAT APPROXIMATES JUSTICE

If the American criminal justice system is to be true to
its name and its purported mission, it must stop using the
probation violation system as an end-run around due process to
resolve new charges for those who are charged with committing
a new offense while on probation. New criminal allegations
should be prosecuted using the procedural mechanisms that
have been developed throughout our history for the prosecution
of criminal charges, whether or not the accused happens to be
on probation at the time of the alleged offense or prosecution.
While it may be appropriate to hold a probationer to a higher
standard of behavior, it is not appropriate to let a probationer
be prosecuted for a new criminal offense under a process that
has been stripped of virtually all of its procedural protections.
Creating protections against this sort of abuse of the probation
violation system will reduce the temptation on the part of some
sentencing judges to use probation as nothing more than a
noose around an offender’s neck. Correcting this misguided use
of probation will create both the appearance and, more
importantly, the reality of observing constitutional principles
and assuring fundamental fairness in this very broken part of
the criminal justice system.
It is plain to any observer, despite judicial protestations
to the contrary, that judges frequently impose probation
violation sentences based upon a new criminal allegation in a
fashion that is designed to punish the probationer for the new
criminal allegation. The consequences in terms of fairness, both
in actuality and in the public perception, are devastating. In
Rhode Island, media coverage of the issue has generated
headlines including “Found Innocent, But Still Jailed,”145
“Guilty, Even While Innocent,”146 and “Take a Ride on Rhode
Island’s Revocation Railroad.”147 Each of these articles lays out
in compelling terms multiple scenarios in which probation
violation hearings were held in advance of, and used as
substitutes for, criminal trials based upon new criminal
allegations. Even when a probationer has been acquitted after
a trial of the new criminal charge, a lengthy sentence based
upon that same conduct continues unabated. Often, the
145

John Hill, Found Innocent, But Still Jailed, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 9. 2009,
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prosecution of a new criminal charge is abandoned or shortcircuited after a violation hearing because the probationer has
already received the desired sentence on the probation
violation and the adversarial testing of the new criminal
allegation never takes place.
Tellingly, there is but one context in which the courts
have routinely recognized the inadequacy of using the
probation violation hearing as a substitute for a criminal trial:
when the accused wins. The courts seem to have little trouble
upholding lengthy sentences following from probation violation
hearings conducted with minimal procedural protections for
the innocent. But when a hearing court has found that the
government’s evidence is insufficient to meet even the reduced
burden of proof used at a violation hearing, the majority of
jurisdictions have rejected the application of collateral estoppel
to prevent the government from nonetheless proceeding with a
trial based on the same allegations.148 When faced with a not
guilty finding at a violation hearing, those courts have
maintained that the criminal trial process is “the intended
forum for ultimate determinations as to guilt or innocence of
newly alleged crimes”149 and that applying collateral estoppel to
prevent the criminal prosecution of the new charge “would
undesirably alter the criminal trial process by permitting
informal revocation determinations to displace the intended
factfinding function of the trial.”150 The Superior Court of
Pennsylvania, in rejecting the application of collateral estoppel
to a not guilty finding at a probation violation hearing,
explained that:
It is neither the[] purpose nor function [of a violation hearing] to
serve as a final arbiter of an individual’s guilt or innocence of
criminal charges. It is only through a criminal trial at which the
defendant is presumed innocent and the [government] bears the
burden of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that contested
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See, e.g., Lucido v. Superior Court, 795 P.2d 1223, 1232-33 (Cal. 1990);
State v. McDowell, 699 A.2d 987, 990 (Conn. 1997); Commonwealth v. Cosgrove, 629
A.2d 1007, 1011 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); State v. Gautier, 871 A.2d 347, 360-61 (R.I.
2005); State v. Brunet, 806 A.2d 1007, 1008 (Vt. 2002). See generally George L. Blum,
Annotation, Determination that State Failed to Prove Charges Relied Upon for
Revocation of Probation as Barring Subsequent Criminal Action Based on Same
Underlying Charges, 2 A.L.R. 5th 262 (1992 & Supp.) (collecting and discussing cases
deciding whether the government’s failure to prove a probation violation at a
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issues of criminal culpability are determined with finality. To cede
this responsibility to a setting that does not adhere to the procedural
safeguards necessary for a fair adjudication of guilt, such as a
probation revocation hearing, would result in a perversion of the
criminal justice system.151

More than one judge has described this process as a “Heads I
win, tails I flip again” proposition,152 allowing the government to
present minimal evidence at a violation hearing with an option
to try again at a trial if unsuccessful. The accused, on the other
hand, must litigate fully at the probation violation hearing
because he or she faces dire consequences if found to be a
violator.
This scenario can easily be avoided by sequencing the
events differently. If a new criminal charge is adjudicated in
advance of the probation violation hearing, the substitution of
the violation hearing for the trial will never take place. If the
probationer admits to or is convicted of the new offense, the
probation violation has been established without sacrificing the
procedural screening mechanisms upon which we rely. And if
the probationer is acquitted at a trial or the charge is
dismissed, under present law the prosecution can generally
still proceed with a probation violation allegation.153 The fact
that prosecutors in so many jurisdictions resist all attempts to
sequence events in this fashion, despite pleas from the
American Bar Association154 and sometimes from their own
courts155 to do so, reveals a great deal about the motivations
151

Cosgrove, 629 A.2d at 1011.
Lucido, 795 P.2d at 1243 (Broussard, J., dissenting) (internal quotation
marks omitted); McDowell, 699 A.2d at 992 (Berdon, J., dissenting) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Lucido, 795 P.2d at 1243 (Broussard, J., dissenting)); Brunet,
806 A.2d at 1017 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Lucido, 795 P.2d at 1243 (Broussard, J., dissenting)).
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See COHEN, supra note 2, § 22:15. Simple fairness, in addition to respect
for the values underlying the criminal justice system, would suggest that this practice
be abandoned.
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AMERICAN BAR ASSOC., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
SENTENCING § 18-7.4 (h) (3d ed. 1994) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, SENTENCING] (“When an alleged violation is based solely on the alleged
commission of another offense, the rules should provide that the final hearing on the
alleged violation ordinarily should be held after disposition of the new criminal
charge.”); see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOC., STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION § 5.3
(1970) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION] (“A revocation
proceeding based solely upon commission of another crime ordinarily should not be
initiated prior to the disposition of that charge.”).
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See, e.g., People v. Coleman, 533 P.2d 1024, 1046 (Cal. 1975) (“[W]e wish to
note that the most desirable method of handling the problems of concurrent criminal
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to be initiated until after disposition of the related criminal proceedings.”); State v.
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behind their use of probation and the probation violation
system.
Several procedural requirements could be implemented
that would make the probation violation process much fairer.
Sequencing events so that a trial on a new criminal allegation
precedes a probation violation hearing based upon that same
conduct, the most obvious of these reforms, has been promoted
by the American Bar Association for decades. Section 18-7.4 (h)
of the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal
Justice provides that “[w]hen an alleged violation is based
solely on the alleged commission of another offense, the rules
should provide that the final hearing on the alleged violation
ordinarily should be held after disposition of the new criminal
charge.”156 Commentary to an earlier version of the standards,
explaining this sequencing recommendation, explicitly
recognized the danger at issue, noting that the relaxation of the
rules of evidence, the absence of a jury, and the lowering of the
burden of proof “can lead to an abuse of the proceeding by
basing revocation upon a new criminal offense when the offense
could not be proved in an ordinary criminal trial.”157 The
commentary further noted that “it would be unseemly for the
probation court to conclude, counter to the result of a criminal
trial, that an offense has occurred and that it could provide a
basis for a revocation.”158
The First Circuit has likewise acknowledged the serious
potential for abuse in holding a violation hearing based upon a
new criminal allegation before the disposition or trial of the
new charge. In Flint v. Mullen,159 a case in which a probationer
was sentenced to twelve years on a violation based solely on a
criminal charge upon which he was ultimately acquitted, the
court indicated its view that “it would be preferable for the
state to have held the violation hearing after the . . . trial,”160
Chase, 588 A.2d 120, 123 (R.I. 1991) (“The disposition of the instant case should
encourage the state to initiate future probation-revocation proceedings with more
concern for judicial economy.”); State v. Begins, 514 A.2d 719, 723 (Vt. 1986) (“We
caution against a policy of scheduling probation revocation hearings prior to trial,
without exercising discretion in each case. . . . [T]he better method of dealing with
problems of concurrent criminal and probation revocation jurisdiction is to postpone
the probation proceedings until after disposition of related criminal proceedings . . . .”).
156
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SENTENCING, supra note 154,
§ 18-7.4 (h).
157
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION, supra note 154, § 5.3 cmt.
158
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adding that it could “see little public interest served by this
kind of timing.”161 As the court explained:
Were the order reversed, the alleged violator could be held on high
bail or without bail if he were a poor bail risk. If there were a
criminal conviction, the subsequent violation decision would be
simple; if there were an acquittal, the court conducting the violation
hearing could proceed with full knowledge of that result, remaining
free to weigh evidence by a lower standard, but having in mind the
acquittal. The result is apt to be, if not also appear, more just.162

The Supreme Courts of Vermont and California have both
opined that the “better” or “most desirable” method of handling
concurrent criminal and probation violation proceedings is for
the trial to proceed first.163
One is hard pressed to find legitimate justifications for
holding a violation hearing based upon a new criminal
allegation in advance of a criminal trial. The only justification
that appears in any of the case law concerns the issue of
detention in advance of the hearing, particularly in light of the
constitutional requirement that a violation hearing take place
“within a reasonable time after the [probationer] is taken into
custody.”164 Several responses to this potential objection make
its resolution rather easy. In many settings, the primary
justification for detention lies not in the person’s status as a
probationer, but rather in his or her status as a person with a
criminal history accused of a new crime. That detention can be
accomplished by the setting of appropriate bail (or holding the
accused without bail when permitted) on the new criminal
offense. In such a scenario, there would be no need for the
prosecution to file the probation violation allegation until after
the new criminal charge is resolved. Another response could be
to detain the probationer on the alleged violation and put the
decision about sequencing in the hands of the probationer,
allowing the probationer to waive the right to a prompt
violation hearing in order to delay it until after the resolution
of the new criminal charge.
When one pushes past objections about detention while
awaiting a violation hearing, it becomes apparent that a
primary reason for sequencing the events as many states do is
161
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to accomplish just what must be prohibited: the creation of a
system in which the right to a trial by jury, the right to fully
confront witnesses, and the right to put the government to its
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt recede into the
background and prosecution by violation hearing becomes the
norm. Perhaps the most obvious and extreme abuses come in
the cases that buck the trend of this shadow system, those in
which the probationer prevails at the probation violation
hearing and is nonetheless prosecuted for the underlying new
crime, and those in which the probationer, having been found
in violation and sentenced severely, prevails at the criminal
trial. In either scenario, the perception, if not the reality, is
that an end-run has been made around the Constitution. Even
if one were to tolerate a system in which a probation violation
hearing comes first, these particular abuses could be stopped.
If the government chooses to present a probationer as a
violator and move forward with a violation hearing, it does not
seem unreasonable to force the government to live with the
consequences of its decision. If the government, even with the
benefit of relaxed rules of evidence, cannot meet a reduced
burden of proof at a violation hearing, it is unclear why the
government should then be allowed another chance to try to
prove the same allegations. But in the majority of jurisdictions
in this country, the government enjoys just that privilege.
Ironically, as noted earlier, courts ruling in this fashion have
generally relied on the argument that the procedures employed
at a violation hearing are insufficiently reliable to justify using
them to resolve a criminal charge. These courts seem not to
recognize the irony that this is precisely how probation
violation hearings are used on a daily basis in thousands of
cases. Common principles of collateral estoppel should be
employed, as they are in some jurisdictions,165 to prevent the
government from relitigating an issue that it lost.

165

See People v. Bone, 412 N.E.2d 444, 447 (Ill. 1980) (noting that collateral
estoppel will apply when “an issue of ultimate fact was decided in the prior revocation
proceeding which was determinative of the issues in the criminal prosecution for the
offenses”); People v. Anzures, 670 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that
collateral estoppel will apply although the revocation hearing and criminal charge are
“technically based on the commission of wholly separate offenses, but where the same
facts are determinative of guilt for each”); State v. Bradley, 626 P.2d 403, 406 (Or. Ct.
App. 1988) (noting that an “express finding on a matter of fact material to a probation
revocation proceeding will collaterally estop the state from” relitigating the same issue
where the issue was “fully litigated at the probation revocation proceeding” (emphasis
omitted)).
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When a probationer is found to have been in violation of
probation based upon a new criminal charge and is ultimately
acquitted of that new charge, again the probationer seems to be
a victim of a gaming of the system. This scenario would be
avoided by sequencing the events properly, but if the hearing
must proceed first, it does not seem unreasonable to let the
issue be revisited in the light of an acquittal after a full trial
replete with constitutional protections. Another way of
reducing the likelihood of this scenario, and of enhancing the
reliability and fairness of a probation violation hearing, would
be to elevate the government’s burden of proof at a probation
violation hearing. The greater the disparity between the
government’s burden at a violation hearing and the
government’s burden at a trial, the greater the likelihood of
unjust or disparate outcomes. When the government’s burden
at a violation hearing is as low as the “reasonable satisfaction”
of the judge, it is far from surprising when a charge that cannot
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt results in a finding of
violation. Do we really intend to have a system in which
probationers can be convicted of new crimes based on a lesser
standard of proof achieved through the introduction of evidence
that would normally be inadmissible? The distance between the
language found in court decisions explaining the purported
purpose of probation violation hearings and the reality as
experienced by participants in the criminal justice system is
staggering.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Something has gone terribly wrong in the American
criminal justice system. In the process of moving from a system
focused on the rehabilitative potential of the defendant to a
system myopically focused on retribution, we have trampled
not only upon the tool with the greatest rehabilitative
potential, but also upon the due process protections that we
supposedly hold most dear. By using probation as a default
sentence for all of those whom we choose not to incarcerate, we
have created burgeoning caseloads that prevent probation from
serving any useful rehabilitative function. Many probationers
go without any supervision whatsoever, and those who are in
need of social services and support rarely get it. Not
surprisingly, then, high percentages of probationers do not
succeed on probation. Many of those wind up incarcerated,
even though the system’s conclusion was that the underlying
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crime did not justify incarceration. The “crime” that we punish
with incarceration is the inability to live up to the terms and
conditions of probation, even if it was entirely unrealistic to
expect the probationer to live up to those terms and conditions
and entirely predictable that the probationer would fail. This is
a peculiar way indeed to make determinations about whom to
incarcerate. A far more logical system would use probation only
when it can serve a real function. In that fashion, probation
officers could actually do their jobs, future criminality could be
dealt with on its own terms, and a simple failure to abide by
imposed norms of behavior and conformity would not become a
cause for incarceration.
One reason it may be hard to convince some
constituencies to abandon the abuse of probation is that they
are wedded to what follows from that abuse: a shadow criminal
justice system in which huge numbers of cases are processed
not through the due process protections that come with the
prosecution of a criminal charge, but through a violation
hearing process that is devoid of virtually all of these
protections. This process is certainly efficient, but does not
reflect the values of justice that our system is supposed to
represent. It is simply inappropriate to hold a violation hearing
at which a criminal charge is adjudicated not through a
criminal trial replete with protections for the innocent, but
rather through a truncated procedure designed for a very
different purpose.
If we persist in proceeding with a probation violation
hearing in advance of a criminal trial on a new charge, we can
at least aspire to level the playing field just a little bit. Those
jurisdictions with very low burdens of proof can require at least
proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence. And if the
accused manages to prevail at a probation violation hearing
based solely on a new criminal charge, traditional principles of
collateral estoppel should prevent the government from trying
a second time to prosecute the accused for the same behavior.
We are all losers when we engage in a process for which
the thinly veiled legal justification is readily transparent to all
as a fraud. All criminal charges should be adjudicated on the
merits. When a probation violation is predicated on a new
criminal charge, the adjudication of that new charge should
normally resolve the issue of whether or not the terms and
conditions of probation have been violated. If the criminal
charge cannot be successfully prosecuted, it should follow that
the probation violation should be dismissed. And if we insist on
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a process that adjudicates the probation violation first, we can
at least abide by procedural rules that more closely
approximate fairness. We owe it to ourselves to restore the
public’s faith in the integrity of the prosecutorial function and
to put the concept of justice back into the criminal justice
system.

